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LABOR-EMPLOYMENT AT WILL-PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
RECOGNIZED. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743
S.W.2d 380 (1988).
On October 31, 1983, Sterling Drug, Inc. (Sterling) discharged
Charles Oxford from its employment. Oxford worked for Sterling
from 1963 until October 1983 under a contract for an indefinite term.
In 1984 Oxford filed suit in Garland County Circuit Court alleging
that Sterling engaged in a systematic campaign to force his resigna-
tion from the company. Sterling officials believed Oxford had re-
ported Sterling to the General Services Administration (GSA) for
pricing violations.' At trial, Oxford denied reporting Sterling to the
GSA. Following the alleged report, Sterling demoted Oxford to the
lowest position in his division. Over an eighteen month period, Ster-
ling officials repeatedly criticized and reprimanded Oxford and denied
him stock he won in a company sales contest.
The trial court instructed the jury on both wrongful discharge
and the tort of outrage. The jury returned a general verdict in Ox-
ford's favor, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.2 The
trial court denied Sterling's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. The court held that Sterling's conduct was not so outra-
geous "as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,"3 and denied a
cause of action for outrage.
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld Oxford's claim for wrong-
ful discharge, however, and for the first time granted relief based on a
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. The court
held that the remedy for this cause of action lies exclusively in con-
tract, rather than in tort. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239,
743 S.W.2d 380 (1988).
The American employment at will doctrine allows an employer
or employee to terminate the employment relationship at any time,
1. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 242, 743 S.W.2d 380, 381 (1988). Ster-
ling's violations resulted in a 1984 settlement with the federal government in which Sterling
paid $1,075,000. Id.
2. The jury awarded $201,700 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Id.
3. Id. at 243, 743 S.W.2d 380, 382 (quoting M.B.M. Co., v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596
S.W.2d 681 (1980)).
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for any reason, where the contract does not specify duration.4 This
common law rule has its roots in English history.' The English law of
duration of service contracts came to prominence through the rule
espoused by Blackstone in 1765.6 Blackstone construed a service con-
tract with an unspecified duration as a hiring for one year.7 The rule
relied largely on the paternalistic nature of the master-servant rela-
tionship which imposed obligations on the employer as a matter of
public policy.'
Initially, the American colonies accepted the English doctrine of
imposing a specified length of service where proof of custom, trade
usage, or agreement between the parties was present.9 However, by
the mid-nineteenth century, the emergence of freedom of contract and
socio-economic theories of freedom of enterprise and laissez-faire re-
sulted in a divergence from English law. I° The traditional master-
servant status gave way to large numbers of employees and commer-
cial relationships that quickly outgrew the reasoning behind the for-
mer laws. 1
Propounded by Horace Gray Wood in 1877, the employment at
will doctrine stated that a general or indefinite hiring would be, prima
facie, a hiring at will. 12 The doctrine offered a solution to the confu-
sion of the times and quickly became established as the majority
rule. 3 The past two decades, however, have resulted in the gradual
erosion of the employment at will doctrine. 4 Advocates of the rule's
4. 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967).
5. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 119 (1976).
6. Id. at 120.
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 425 (1978).
Although Blackstone was primarily concerned with protecting the common laborers from sea-
sonal hiring and firing, the rule applied to all classes of servants.
8. Comment, Employment-At-Will: Defining the Parameters, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 377,
390 (1986).
9. Note, Wrongful Discharge--Sexual Harassment Equated With Prostitution to Find
Public Policy Exception, 8 UALR L.J. 49, 51 (1986).
10. Comment, Protecting the Private Sector at Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A
Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777, 782.
11. See Feinman, supra note 5, at 123.
12. H.G. WooD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1st ed.
1877).
13. Feinman, supra note 5, at 125-26.
14. Crowell v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, 502 A.2d 573 (1984)
(discharge of at will employee violated public policy supporting doctrine of equitable estoppel);
McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988) (at will employee
wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit illegal act); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Camp-
bell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987) (provisions in employee handbook modified at will contract);
Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) (wrongful discharge finding
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abolition generally point to the importance of job security in modem
times and the evils of employer coercion as primary reasons for its
demise.' 5 Congressional legislation has created a number of excep-
tions to the rule making it unlawful to discharge an employee on the
basis of sex, race, creed or religion, 16 for engaging in union activities,' 7
or solely on the basis of age.' 8
In addition, judicial intervention has modified the rule, resulting
in four general classes of exceptions.' 9 One exception to the lawful
discharge of an at will employee involves proof of implied-in-fact
promises of employment for specific duration or reliance on a promise
of job security.2° A second exception created by some jurisdictions
exists through an implied duty to terminate only in good faith-a reli-
ance on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in all
contracts. 2' Third, courts protect the at will employee by imposing
tort obligations within the contract.22 Arkansas recognizes the tort of
outrage as a remedy for employees subjected to malicious treatment
by their employers.23 Finally, a general public policy exception may
upheld where at will employee fired for threatening to report employer violation of federal
regulations); Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App. 1984), aff'd 687 S.W.2d
733 (Tex. 1985) (at will employee wrongfully discharged for refusing to violate federal statute).
15. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413-14 (1967).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
17. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
18. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). See
Comment, supra note 10, at 784-85 for further discussion of state and federal legislation.
19. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
20. Id. at 1820-2 1. See Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d
501 (1987) (Arkansas Supreme Court recognized, for first time, a good cause exception to the
employment at will doctrine where discharged employee relied on a personnel manual gov-
erning conduct for termination). See also Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich.
App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (employee relied on defendant's promise of job security in
leaving competitor).
21. Note, supra note 19, at 1821. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974), the court held that an employee's refusal to date her foreman violated good faith
and fair dealing which is implied in every contract-whether at will or definite. In Lucas v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984), the court held that Arkansas case law
supports this implied covenant, even in at will contracts. However, the court in Scholtes v.
Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982) rejected the implied covenant
in at will contracts as a term implied in law.
22. Note, supra note 19, at 1821. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (at will employee dismissed in retaliation for his insistence that
employer comply with federal regulations, sufficiently alleged cause of action in tort for wrong-
ful discharge); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (tort cause of
action for wrongful discharge upheld where employee was terminated for filing workman's
compensation claim).
23. The tort of outrage was first defined in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596
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exist where an employer discharges an employee in violation of the
public good.24
The public policy exception eludes clear definition, resulting in
its label by one court as the "Achilles' heel" of the wrongful discharge
principal.25 The leading case in this area is Petermann v. Local 396,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.26 Petermann held that the
discharge of an employee for refusing to commit perjury for his em-
ployer violated public policy. 27 Although the decision rested on an
act specifically prohibited by a California criminal statute,28 the court
held that the public policy exception could extend to non-criminal
conduct as well.29
After Petermann, courts in other jurisdictions followed suit in
recognizing this exception.3" In addition to protecting at will employ-
ees from discharge for refusal to violate a criminal statute, courts be-
gan recognizing public policy exceptions for the exercise of statutory
rights3I and statutory duties.3 2 Still other courts created exceptions in
the absence of any statutory authority and found certain acts of retali-
ation and discharge to be repugnant to the general public policy of the
state.33
The Arkansas Supreme Court first hinted at a possible accept-
S.W.2d 681 (1980). "By extreme and outrageous conduct, we mean conduct that is so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id. at 280, 596
S.W.2d at 687.
24. Note, supra note 19, at 1822. See Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1010
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (public policy exception recognized where at will employee was discharged to
avoid the vesting of his pension); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1970) (employee who was terminated for hiring an attorney to negotiate a claim that em-
ployer violated minimum wage laws had cause of action). See generally Comment, Wrongful
Discharge of Employees Terminable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK.
L. REV. 729 (1981).
25. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1981).
26. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
27. Id. at 185, 344 P.2d at 28.
28. CAL. PEN. CODE § 118 (West 1988) makes perjury unlawful.
29. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 186, 344 P.2d at 28.
30. See Comment, supra note 24, at 735-40.
31. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge of
at will employee for filing workman's compensation claim was violation of public policy).
32. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (wrongful discharge found where
employee fired for taking time off to serve on jury).
33. See cases cited supra note 24 and Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) ("bad faith" termination of at will employee whose discharge enabled
employer to avoid payment of bonuses).
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ance of the public policy exception in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce.34
Although the court rejected Ms. Counce's argument that her em-
ployer's breach of contract violated public policy, the court indicated
it would consider a claim for wrongful discharge in a case involving a
statutory right or duty, or "some other well established public
policy."35
In subsequent decisions, however, the Arkansas courts failed to
embrace the exception.36 In Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc. , the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit remanded on the grounds that Ar-
kansas may recognize the public policy exception.38 Lucas involved
the discharge of an at will employee who rejected the sexual advances
of her foreman. The Eighth Circuit equated the foreman's actions
with solicitation of prostitution. Because prostitution is illegal by
statute,39 the court found the plaintiff's discharge violated public pol-
icy.' However, at least one commentator has criticized Lucas as
reaching "well beyond the bounds of any Arkansas case decided
[previously].""1
Twice in 1987 the Arkansas Supreme Court alluded to its will-
ingness to recognize a public policy exception, but was unable to ap-
ply the exception to the facts, as outlined in Counce.42 It was not
until the present case, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford,43 that the court
found itself squarely faced with whether or not to recognize the public
policy exception and, more importantly, with how to define it.
Addressing Oxford's claim of outrage, the court relied on the
Counce" test that an employer's conduct must be so extreme as to
34. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
35. Id. at 273, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
36. Newton v. Brown & Root, 280 Ark. 337, 658 S.W.2d 370 (1983) (public policy excep-
tion rejected where employee contributed to hazardous working conditions); Jackson v.
Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984) (lack of sufficient facts precluded adoption
of public policy exception in demurrer to complaint).
37. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
38. Id. at 1203.
39. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-102 (1987).
40. 736 F.2d at 1205.
41. Note, supra note 9, at 57.
42. In Proctor v. East Cent. Ark. EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 267, 724 S.W.2d 163, 165 (1987),
the court noted that "[a]bsent a valid contract the only other theory to allow recovery for an
aggrieved employee would be based upon public policy considerations," but found that an
employee manual did not create a valid contract because it did not assure employment for a
definite term. In Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501
(1987), although the court recognized a good cause exception, it declined to find a public
policy violation.
43. 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988).
44. 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (1980).
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exceed "all possible bounds of decency," and be so "atrocious," as to
be "utterly intolerable in a civilized society."45 Acknowledging Ster-
ling's conduct, which included continuous criticism and assignment
of menial and unreasonable tasks over an eighteen month period, and
the stress in Oxford's personal life, the court, nevertheless, felt that
Sterling's actions did not rise to the required level of "outrageous"
conduct.46
Citing two recent Arkansas Supreme Court decisions41 in which
tort of outrage actions were affirmed, the court emphasized particular
facts in distinguishing Oxford. The emphasis in Tandy Corp. v.
Bone48 was on the fact that despite knowledge of the employee's
weakened mental state, the employer refused him medication during
interrogation. The court stressed in Hess v. Treece49 that the em-
ployer's harassment continued over a two year period. Apparently,
the court felt Sterling's conduct was inapposite to the above cases and
denied the claim. 50
The court next addressed the cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge. After first reaffirming Arkansas' allegiance to the employ-
ment at will doctrine,5" the court pointed to its most recent
modification of the rule found in Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hos-
pital.52 The court traced the progression of its softening attitude to-
ward the employment at will doctrine53 beginning with its initial
leanings in Counce.54 The court noted public policy exceptions recog-
nized by other jurisdictions such as termination of an employee for
refusing to violate a specific statute, 5 termination for exercising a
statutory right5 6 and for complying with a statutory duty,5 7 employer
conduct involving bad faith or malice, 8 implied covenants of good
45. Id.
46. 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988).
47. Hess v. Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985); Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark.
399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984).
48. 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984).
49. 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985).
50. 294 Ark. at 245, 743 S.W.2d at 383.
51. Id. (citing Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982)).
52. 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987) (good cause provision allowed).
53. 294 Ark. at 245-46, 743 S.W.2d at 383.
54. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
55. 294 Ark. at 245-46, 743 S.W.2d at 383. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (employee refusal to assist in illegal
price fixing).
56. 294 Ark. at 246, 743 S.W.2d at 384. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill
Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (employee participation in union activities).
57. 249 Ark. at 246, 743 S.W.2d at 384.
58. Id.
622 [Vol. 1 1:617
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faith and fair dealing, 59 and termination for "whistle blowing."'
The court made special reference to Palmateer v. International
Harvester61 and Wagner v. City of Globe.62 The court approvingly
quoted the holding in Palmateer that "there is no public policy more
basic... than the enforcement of a State's criminal code... and the
cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof is essential to ef-
fective implementation of that policy." 63 Wagner was favorably cited
for its holding that "whistle blowing" is an important public policy of
the state. 6' The court's focus on these cases indicates a particular af-
finity to the public policy exception where statutory law protects the
employee's actions. Concluding its survey, the court "followed [its]
lead" in Counce and held that "an at-will employee has a cause of
action for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-
established public policy of the state."
65
Although dicta by the court stated that "an employer should not
have an absolute and unfettered right to terminate an employee for an
act done for the good of the public,"' 66 the court purported to narrow
its definition of the public policy exception by securing its foundation
in constitutional and statutory law.67 The court relied on statutory
authority6 which makes it unlawful to retaliate against a witness, in-
formant, or juror. The state thus has a strong public interest in en-
couraging reports of illegal activity. "The public policy of the state is
contravened if an employer discharges an employee for reporting a
violation of state or federal law."69 Oxford's alleged disclosure of
Sterling's pricing violations and his subsequent termination consti-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 248, 743 S.W.2d at 384. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (report of adulterated milk to health authorities).
61. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
62. 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986).
63. 294 Ark. at 248, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (quoting Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 132, 421
N.E.2d 876, 879). In Palmateer officials discharged an employee for aiding the investigation of
a co-worker's suspected criminal activities.
64. Id. (citing Wagner, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986)). Wagner involved the wrongful
discharge of a police officer who reported the illegal detention of a prisoner.
65. Id. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
66. Id.
67. Id. "It is generally recognized that the public policy of a state is found in its constitu-
tion and statutes." Id. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-112 (1987) provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of retaliation against a witness, informant, or juror
if he harms or threatens to harm another by any unlawful act in retaliation for
anything lawfully done in the capacity of witness, informant, or juror.
(b) Retaliation against witnesses, informants, or jurors is a Class A misdemeanor.
69. 294 Ark. at 250, 743 S.W.2d at 386.
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tuted wrongful discharge in violation of that policy.70
Upon its election to recognize the public policy exception, an-
other decision facing the court was the resolution of an appropriate
remedy. The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions recognize
actions in tort.7' Courts which imply a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing generally recognize a contract remedy, 72 while other juris-
dictions acknowledge that both theories are available.73
The court adhered, however, to the reasoning in Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet,4 a 1983 Wisconsin case. Wisconsin is the only
state that has adopted an exclusive contract remedy for wrongful dis-
charge based on the public policy exception.75 The Brockmeyer case
points to the fundamental difference between contract and tort ac-
tions.7 6 The tort objective lies in protection of freedom from harm
while contract actions seek to ensure that promises are performed.77
The Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that a wrongful discharge ac-
tion is premised on the theory that the employer has breached an im-
plied promise not to discharge in violation of public policy." A
contract action "strikes a fair balance" in that it protects employees
from retaliation while limiting the remedy to damages in contract,
rather than in tort.79 The court further reasoned that a cause of ac-
tion for outrage is always available for those cases in which the em-
ployer's conduct is extreme.80
Of the several potential issues for remand, the court was primar-
ily concerned with damage calculation.8 1 The court contrasted the
computation of damages for a wrongfully discharged employee under
70. The court found there was sufficient evidence that Sterling had campaigned to force
Oxford's resignation, thus resulting in constructive discharge. The court also held that sub-
stantial evidence will support a jury verdict for wrongful discharge. Id.
71. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981)).
72. Id. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977)).
73. Id. (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980)
(action in contract predicated on breach of implied provision not to discharge in violation of
public policy and tort action based on duty not to discharge)).
74. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
75. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
76. 113 Wis. 2d at 575 n.14, 335 N.W.2d at 841 n.14.
77. Id.
78. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385. Brockmeyer stated that "since the primary con-
cern in these actions is to make the wronged employee 'whole,'" reinstatement and back pay
are most appropriate. 113 Wis. 2d at 575, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
79. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386. The court also held that the trial court properly admit-
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a contract for a fixed term82 with damages under a contract for an
indefinite term.83 The court concluded that the latter approach was
too speculative and limited damages to lost wages from the date of
termination until trial date, minus any sum the employee earned or
could have earned with due diligence.8 4
In his dissent, Justice Purtle felt that both the wrongful discharge
and tort of outrage claims should have been affirmed.8 5 As to the
latter, he felt that Sterling's conduct far exceeded that complained of
in Hess v. Treece 86 and that by reversing Oxford's claim of outrage,
the court was "in effect punishing the appellee for the alleged per-




Noting his approval of the public policy exception, Justice Purtle
extracted a broad definition from the majority opinion. "I agree...
that 'a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at
will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation
is not in the best interests of the economic system or the public good
and constitutes a breach of the employment contract.' ",88 The dissent
made no mention of the majority's emphasis on statutory law as a
basis for defining the boundaries of public policy.
Justice Purtle strongly criticized the court's limitation of recov-
ery to contract remedies.89 He explained that the employee who suf-
fers physical and emotional pain as well as financial losses will remain
uncompensated while the employer will go virtually unpunished. 90
Employers will feel little threat from the knowledge that their retalia-
tory conduct will result only in payment of back wages to the
employee.
Oxford is significant in two respects. First, Oxford finally opens
ted evidence of the federal government's audit and negotiated settlement concerning the pric-
ing violations.
82. Id. (citing Seaman Stores v. Porter, 180 Ark. 860, 23 S.W.2d 249 (1930) (employee
recovers lost wages from date of termination up to trial date, or if trial occurs after expiration
date, the amount of agreed wages for the term)).
83. Id. The court referred to various factors such as number of years employed, average
seniority, and the employee's intention of remaining with the company.
84. Id. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87. The court held that it is also possible to recover
for any other tangible benefits lost. Future damages are not recoverable. The court further
held that Oxford's income from the sale of real estate did not amount to "earnings" for consid-
eration of mitigation. Id.
85. Id. at 253, 743 S.W.2d at 387 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
86. 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985).
87. 294 Ark. at 254, 743 S.W.2d at 388.
88. Id.




the door to the public policy exception. The question is "how wide?"
Although the court acknowledges, in a broad sense, that employers
should not be allowed to terminate at will employees for acts "done
for the good of the public,"'" it appears to confine its specific holding
to employer conduct in violation of statutory law.
9 2
Nonetheless, the court approvingly noted a number of cases from
other jurisdictions which spanned the length of the spectrum in the
public policy arena.93 This may indicate that although the court
seems to feel most comfortable in relying on statutory law to define
the boundaries of this exception, it has not ruled out the possibility of
widening its parameters.
Should the court decide, however, to confine the boundaries to
conduct addressed only in the statutes, it will be interesting to see how
far judicial interpretation of the law will extend to find public policy
violations. It is not a drastic step for courts to infer a remedy from
statutes which clearly give an employee certain rights; for example, an
employee who is discharged for filing a workman's compensation
claim. 94 However, as one commentator suggests, when both the rem-
edy and the right must be inferred, the court "must be in a position to
rationalize a broad reading of the policy-setting statute(s) involved." 95
By recognizing "whistle blowing" as an employee right deserving of
protection through the public policy exception, the Arkansas
Supreme Court goes beyond the sphere of basic employment relation-
ships. The court comes closer to the Eighth Circuit's "activist" ap-
proach in Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc. 96 Although the statute on
which the court relies in Oxford appears to be more closely tailored to
the employer's offense than was the statute in Lucas, the court has,
nonetheless, established a precedent of implying employee rights and
remedies from law outside the employment field.
Speculation remains open as to whether the court will eventually
extend the exception to expressions of public policy outside the stat-
91. Id. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
94. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
95. Comment, supra note 10, at 793.
96. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit's equation of a statute outlawing
prostitution with an employer's retaliatory discharge of an employee who refused his sexual
advances to find a public policy exception has been criticized as going beyond Arkansas law.
See text accompanying note 41. But see Youngdahl, The Erosion of the Employment-At- Will
Doctrine in Arkansas, 40 ARK. L. REV. 545, 556-57 (1987) ("Without a doubt a requirement
that an employee commit prostitution to keep a job would be actionable in Arkansas.")
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utes, 97 or even more significantly, to court-created concerns in the ab-
sence of any written authority.9 The latter approach, as one writer
notes, depends on a court's "jurisprudential views regarding judicial
activism." 99 The Arkansas Supreme Court continues to cling to the
employment at will doctrine by limiting the public policy exception to
employer conduct based on statutory law. But its grasp is slipping.
This is good news for employees.
Unfortunately for the employee, the remedy for wrongful dis-
charge in contravention of public policy essentially limits the em-
ployee to back pay."° Regardless of any mental or physical pain and
suffering experienced by the employee, the employee's remedy lies
only in contract, which includes lost wages from the time of discharge
up until the date of trial."° ' Although the court provides assurance
that the tort of outrage is still available for egregious cases, decisions
involving this theory appear inconsistent. As Justice Purtle explains
in his dissent, the application of the facts to the test for outrage as set
forth in Counce'02 seems to vary from case to case. In addition, the
tort of outrage is difficult to prove. 03
One proponent of the contract remedy, however, argues that bas-
ing a cause of action simply on the monetary value of its remedial
award defeats the purpose of allowing redress for wrongful dis-
charge."° Threatening employers with punitive damages, as in tort
actions, may greatly impair the chances of promoting healthier rela-
tionships in the workplace. 0 5 Justice Purtle however, vigorously ar-
gues the opposite, stating that " 'wrongful discharge' by its very terms
is a tort."'0 6 In adhering to the Brockmeyer '07 exclusive contract ap-
proach, Arkansas becomes part of a distinct minority, and "by far the
97. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (unless an
employee identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may still be terminated without
cause). One example of non-statutory policy is the Professional Code of Responsibility.
98. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Monge was
significant in that the employee's action for wrongful discharge for refusing to go out with her
employer was upheld with no reference to statutes or to the constitution.
99. Comment, supra note 8, at 387.
100. 294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 387.
101. Id. at 254-A, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87.
102. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
103. Youngdahl, supra note 98, at 557.
104. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights. A Changing Concept of Employ-
ment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 487 (1980).
105. Id.
106. 294 Ark. at 254-C, 747 S.W.2d at 580.
107. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). See text accompanying note 75.
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most regressive state in protecting workers and the public welfare." 10 8
The Oxford decision may thus prove to the at will employee that
"all that glitters is not gold." While a cause of action for wrongful
discharge based on the public policy exception now appears reason-
ably attainable, a realistic recovery for employer misconduct lies only
in the rather unpredictable action for outrage. Nonetheless, at will
employees may at least see the opening of the door to the public pol-
icy exception continue to widen as Arkansas loosens its long held
grasp on the employment at will doctrine.
Sarah Lewis
108. 294 Ark. at 254-C, 747 S.W.2d at 580.
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